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Abstract
Distributed ledger technology oers numerous desirable at-
tributes to applications in the enterprise context. However,
with distributed data and decentralized computation on a
shared platform, privacy and condentiality challenges arise.
Any design for an enterprise system needs to carefully cater
for use case specic privacy and condentiality needs. With
the goal to facilitate the design of enterprise solutions, this
paper aims to provide a guide to navigate and aid in deci-
sions around common requirements and mechanisms that
prevent the leakage of private and condential information.
To further contextualize key concepts, the design guide is
then applied to three enterprise DLT protocols: Hyperledger
Fabric, Corda, and orum.
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1 Introduction
Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and blockchain in par-
ticular are widely known as the technologies behind digital
asset platforms such as Bitcoin [21] and Ethereum [7]. ese
decentralized protocols oer parties the ability to record the
exchange of assets and data on an append-only ledger with-
out the involvement of a central authority. e promise of
DLT is to provide a secure and tamper-proof record of every
transaction that has ever taken place on a shared network.
Applications of this technology, however, are not limited to
the management of assets in the public domain.
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In the enterprise context, permissioned DLTs can assist
with a number of otherwise hard to manage issues. Shared
ledgers facilitate an audit of past transactions, aid in contract
litigation, record consent of parties via digital signatures,
and can be used to transparently execute shared and version-
controlled business logic. However, having data replicated
across multiple entities inherently poses challenges for the
preservation of privacy and condentiality. While similar,
albeit use case dependent, challenges arise in both public
and permissioned ledgers, it can be the legal, regulatory, or
contractual requirements that demand particular diligence
for the design of enterprise solutions.
In this paper, we will address privacy and condentiality
for (a) the group of interacting parties, (b) transaction data,
and (c) business logic. While public DLTs place a strong
focus on pseudonymity, in a permissioned ledger revealing
an identity may not only be acceptable but is oen a legal
requirement. However, not all businesses may want their
relationships with other parties to be visible to unauthorised
network members, meaning that enterprise DLT platforms
may need to oer the possibility to keep interactions private.
Moreover, data may be strategic to the participating business
entities or be sensitive, such as customer data or Personally
Identifying Information (PII) (Social Security Numbers, pass-
port details, driver’s licenses, etc). In public blockchains the
logic that controls state updates can be fully transparent (as
in Bitcoin) or revealed as bytecode (as in Ethereum) with ex-
ecution of the logic and its results made public. Meanwhile,
for enterprise use cases, any business logic may contain sen-
sitive business information, requiring that code is not shared
with all network participants.
In an enterprise solution, the specic use case will deter-
mine the privacy and condentiality requirements of the
architecture. Catering to these requires the architect to nav-
igate a vast space of possible privacy and condentiality
preserving mechanisms. To facilitate the design of enter-
prise solutions, the following paper aims to serve as a design
guide for systems in the enterprise context that are built on
distributed ledger technology.
is paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes
mechanisms to preserve privacy of interactions, condential-
ity of transactions and data, and condentiality of business
processes. A guide for assessing DLT platforms with respect
to their ability to meet specic enterprise requirements is
provided in Section 3, that is subsequently applied to the use
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case of leers of credit in Section 4. Section 5 describes how
privacy and condentiality are addressed in the three largest
DLTs for enterprise: Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) [3], Corda
[14], and orum [15]. e paper is concluded in Section 6
with some nal remarks.
2 Privacy and Condentiality Mechanisms
e following provides a reference to mechanisms that can
be deployed to preserve privacy and condentiality in DLT
solutions, with a particular focus on their utility in enter-
prise solutions. Privacy is used in the context of identity
protection of individual parties as well as participants of a
transaction. Condentiality is used when relating to the pro-
tection of data or business logic. e available mechanisms
to preserve privacy and condentiality across solutions reach
from structural design considerations to the use of cryptog-
raphy.
2.1 Privacy of interactions
e verication of identities of parties onboarded to the
platform is a common requirement of enterprise blockchain
solutions. is function is usually carried out by a service
that allows parties to map public keys to identities through
public key infrastructure (PKI) [23]. is service may op-
tionally expose a global membership list so that parties may
establish relationships. However, the group of parties en-
tering into a business relationship oen needs to be kept
private from the wider network.
Separation of ledgers A network can be set up with not
one global, but several private ledgers, where each is respon-
sible for facilitating transactions between interacting parties.
is segregation can be established as a permanent network
structure that holds a separate ledger as its own blockchain
[3]. or on a per-transaction basis [14], where data are sent
only to involved parties.
One-time public keys In DLT platforms where ownership
of assets is recorded against an address derived from a public
key, one-time public keys can be used to mask the identity of
the asset owner [14]. Transacting parties and any entity that
needs to verify signatures are then provided with a certicate
that links the pseudonymous public key with an identity.
Zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) of identity ZKP is a crypto-
graphic technique that can be used to prove that a party has a
particular piece of information, or that a certain condition is
met, without revealing the information itself. In the context
of identity, ZKPs can be used to prove the possession of a set
of credentials without exposing the identity [8]. Using ZKPs,
digital signatures from a party can be completely unlinkable
to each other and to an identity.
2.2 Condentiality of transactions and data
Transaction data are at the center of most business interac-
tions. Such data can contain trade secrets, nancial records,
or otherwise private agreements that may be sensitive not
only to businesses but also to their clients.
Separation of ledgers Similarly to the way the separation
of ledgers can provide privacy for interacting parties, it also
provides condentiality of data, revealing transaction data
only to parties within the network partition. If a public
record of the existence of a transaction is required, a hash
of transaction data may optionally be published on a shared
ledger.
O-chain data In cases where data need to be kept con-
dential to a subset of participants within a ledger, private
data can be kept in an o-chain database. is can either be
natively integrated and hosted on a peer (peer o-chain), or
be kept separate from the DLT layer entirely. Transactions
on the ledger can contain a hash of the o-chain data to pro-
vide authoritative evidence and an accompanying audit trail
for involved parties to verify the provenance of private data.
Storing data o-chain has the additional property of enabling
data to be deleted, for example, if required by law [10]. How-
ever, allowing data deletion is in some way contradictory to
the promise of an immutable, auditable record.
Symmetric key encryption Symmetric key encryption,
for example the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [22],
can be used to keep data condential by encrypting values
with a shared key between parties, which commonly gets
shared over the network using PKI. In order to implement
this mechanism, use case and geographical region need to
permit the sharing of encrypted data.
Merkle tree tear-os One way of eliminating the need to
share all data with all counterparties is to use a method
called Merkle tree tear-os [19]. A Merkle tree is a data
structure where every leaf is a hash of data, and every non-
leaf node is a hash of the combined hashes of its child nodes.
In some DLTs, parties that are required to sign a transaction
do so on the root of the Merkle tree constructed from all the
transaction contents. If some data within the transaction
needs to be kept condential from a party, the root of the
condential branch can be provided to them. e party is
able to compute and sign on the Merkle root without having
access to the condential data.
Multiparty computation Multiparty computation (MPC)
[9] describes a collection of cryptographic algorithms that
allows a group of parties to compute a shared function on
private values. Each party carries out a computation on their
private data and shares the result with the other parties. All
collected results are then used by each party to compute the
same shared function, resulting in one consistent value that
can be commied to the ledger. In DLT, this means that no
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private values need to be shared between parties and each
participant would be able to store their data o-chain. All
functions and algorithms performed on the data are known
to all involved parties.
Zero-knowledge proofs In the context of data condential-
ity, a ZKP can be used to only provide enough information
to prove that a certain fact is true (e.g. ”the party has the
appropriate funds”) without revealing raw values [13]. In
enterprise DLTs, this becomes relevant when a precondition
needs to be met before a smart contract will authorize and
carry out a certain transaction, but the party in question does
not want to reveal information beyond a boolean armation.
ZKPs need to be implemented specically for a scenario and
are currently only available for very specic functions [20].
Homomorphic computation Homomorphic encryption
[12] describes cryptographic methods that allow for the com-
putation of certain functions on encrypted input parame-
ters to produce an equally encrypted output. In theory this
means that any party can carry out the computation on in-
put data, vouch for correct execution, and thus be part of
validation of transactions without being able to inspect any
raw values. Since homomorphic computation is still in the
proof-of-concept stage and, moreover, has only been shown
to enable a very limited set of operations, this method is
infeasible for implementation in current systems [16].
Trusted execution environments Trusted execution en-
vironments (TEEs) are hardware security modules within a
CPU that guarantee condentiality of executable code and
data inside it [2]. Programs inside TEEs are physically iso-
lated from the rest of the CPU, meaning no other soware
can access or modify them. Each TEE owns a set of private
keys that are embedded in the chip during manufacturing,
with the corresponding public keys held by the manufacturer.
e TEE can provide an aestation of its state and the code
running inside it, that can be signed by its private key, and
is veriable by the public key. ese features of TEEs mean
they can be used to run smart contract code in a way that
will keep both the code itself and the data around the smart
contracts condential. Larger platforms have only recently
started experimenting with TEEs [6] [17].
2.3 Condentiality of business logic
A smart contract denes the conditions that need to be met
when submiing a transaction to a ledger. is can include
a list of parties that need to endorse or sign a transaction
as well as pre-dened logic that must be run to compute a
valid parameter value to be commied. Smart contract code
needs to be distributed to parties that are required to endorse
ledger updates to enable them to verify independently that
proposed transactions abide by the agreed-upon logic.
Installation of smart contracts on involved nodes only
Since smart contracts operate on a given ledger, the separa-
tion of ledgers means a separation of contracts, too, making
them available only to members of the sub-network. Regard-
less of how a network is organized however, it is desirable
for a DLT to be able to distribute smart contracts only to
those nodes that are needed for endorsement of transactions.
O-chain execution engine Another mechanism to pre-
vent business logic being revealed to non-involved parties, is
through use of an o-chain execution engine [1]. e smart
contract code then only contains functions to read from and
write to the ledger. is not only prevents leaks of business
logic, but also means the implementation is not bound to any
particular programming language. Additional challenges to
enforce simultaneous updates across all engines for a par-
ticular ledger may arise. Furthermore, some DLTs enforce
participants to come to agreement on the smart contract
before they can be used for transaction endorsement.
Trusted execution environments TEEs, as previously de-
scribed in Section 2.2, provide an environment for the secure
execution of code. In DLTs, they can be used to execute
smart contracts without allowing access to the clear text
version of the logic.
3 Design Guide
Use cases and solutions are multifaceted. Apart from use case
driven privacy and condentiality requirements, an architect
may need to consider legal and regulatory constraints. Fur-
thermore, requirements may vary between dierent types
of data. is could mean that a solution needs to allow for
personal data to be deleted (e.g. as per the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [10]), or that encrypted data
cannot be shared. As such, an architect may choose to imple-
ment more than one method if dierent sets of data require
dierent levels of condentiality.
3.1 Designing for privacy of interactions
Platforms oer privacy control for dierent levels of granu-
larity that can be tailored to the privacy requirements of a
use case. If a group of parties know each other, and members
wish to interact privately, they may want to use a ledger that
is separate from the main chain. If on any given ledger a
sub-group of parties does not want to reveal that they are
transacting they can exchange one-time public keys that
cannot be linked directly to an identity. In the case where
an individual party wishes to remain entirely private but is
still required to sign or commit a transaction, they have the
ability to use ZKP to prove their identity.
3.2 Designing for condentiality of transactions
Figure 1 aims to guide the reader in mapping transaction con-
dentiality requirements to available mechanisms. A rst
important decision point involves regulatory obligations,
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such as ”the right to be forgoen” [10]. Since distributed
ledgers inherently do not allow for the removal of entries,
data need to be kept o-chain if deletion is required. Note
that some ledger implementations oer the ability to ”prune”
the chain to allow archiving of older transactions [18], [14].
However, archived entries are generally still available to
parties on request. Given enough computing resources, en-
crypted data can be decrypted, which means that parties
may prefer not to share even encrypted data with the wider
network. If on-chain records are still desired to make use
of endorsement protocols or the append-only character of a
ledger, this will usually lead to the implementation of seg-
regated ledgers with constrained membership. Additional
Merkle tree tear-os can be implemented if a transaction
contains data irrelevant to one or more participating par-
ties and must be kept private. Unless uninvolved network
parties are required to endorse the correctness of an other-
wise condential transaction, segregated ledgers may more
generally be the preferred solution. Note that by storing a
hash of data on a shared ledger, it is recorded that a transac-
tion occurred without revealing its content. If independent
validation while keeping data condential is desirable, unin-
volved nodes can provision trusted execution environments,
which provides the added benet that business logic need not
be revealed. Homomorphic computation, while not mature
enough to date, may also eventually enable the processing
of encrypted values. In some cases, a transaction may rely
on private data that cannot be shared between transacting
parties. Zero-knowledge proofs can provide boolean arma-
tion, for example to prove that a party has sucient funds.
If a shared function needs to be computed on private values,
such as a would be the case for a secret ballot, multiparty
computation can be used. Most enterprise platforms are
puing continued eort into advancing ZKPs and MPC to
make them natively available. Not captured in this diagram
is the case where a node is administered by a third party that
may not be trusted with raw data. In that case, transaction
data can be encrypted through symmetric or asymmetric
cryptography.
3.3 Designing for condentiality of business logic
ere are a number of factors that may inuence the choice
of mechanism to keep business logic private. Four criteria
an architect may want to consider are whether an imple-
mentation (1) keeps logic private, (2) oers in-built smart
contract versioning, (3) hides data from the node adminis-
trator, and/or (4) allows for business logic to be wrien in
any programming language. ere may be network cong-
urations in which a node is administered by a third party
that should not have access to unencrypted data or business
logic. For the case where contract code requires access to
the condential encrypted data, it is possible to run compu-
tations in a trusted execution environment. If this level of
condentiality is not needed but business logic remains con-
dential, contracts can be installed only on involved nodes
or alternatively can be run using a separate execution engine.
A separate engine allows for the free choice of programming
language, which may be especially relevant for sectors that
use domain-specic languages. However, an external engine
will not benet from the mechanism in-built to most DLT
platforms that ensures that all nodes run the same version of
smart contract code, meaning that version control will need
to be managed outside the DLT layer.
Is data
condential?
Can encrypted
data be shared
and stored?
Data private to
owner only?
Boolean
proofs
enough?
Is deletion
necessary?
Parts of data private
to one or more parties?
Single ledger
Merkle tree
tear-os on
separate
ledger
MPC with
o-chain
data
ZKP
Homomorphic
computation
O-chain
data with
public hash
Separation of
ledgers with
optional hash
Y
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
N Y
Collective
computation?
TEE
Are validators
allowed to read
transactions?
Y
Y/N
Need to hide
business logic?
Y
Y
N
N
N
Figure 1. Guide to mapping condentiality requirements
on data to available techniques.
3.4 Common technical challenges
Enterprise solutions oer a variety of techniques to ensure
that parties, data, and code are kept private using network
design and encryption methods. However, when permission-
ing a platform, some other factors need to be considered that
are independent of the particular DLT being used.
Ordering transactions On a distributed ledger ensuring
all nodes in the network agree on the same state (or at least
the part of the state they are entitled to see) is imperative. e
service that provides ordering of transactions to construct
a correct view of the state is an integral part of any DLT
platform. For some of the platforms reviewed (Fabric and
Corda), this service has visibility of all DLT events, including
parties to transactions and transaction details. When assess-
ing a DLT for suitability, architects must consider whether
the ordering service meets privacy and condentiality re-
quirements and if parties can feasibly run their own service
to mitigate leaks.
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Permissioning infrastructure Ultimately, any DLT solu-
tion will need to be hosted on some organization’s infrastruc-
ture, potentially exposing ledger entries and transactions
to system administrators. To prevent any leak, ideally, a
network should be designed such that all layers of the appli-
cation (i.e. user interface, middleware, DLT) can be hosted
on a per-organization level, giving each party on the network
the ability to fully control their own environment. Parties
should optionally be able to run a node on the cloud, choos-
ing from a number of Blockchain-as-a-Service providers.
When choosing a DLT platform for enterprise, it is useful
to be aware of which cloud providers natively support the
chosen solution. In cases where businesses cannot or do not
wish to manage their own infrastructure, they may need to
rely on an external provider, trusting a third party with main-
taining privacy and condentiality. In this way, nancial and
time constraints may require an organization to compromise
on privacy and/or condentiality.
Performance and scalability e benets of a DLT so-
lution become more obvious the more parties are sharing
one business network. is inherently means that at some
point, performance at scale of the solution will need to be
assessed. While enterprise platforms commonly oer one
core mechanism to protect private and condential informa-
tion, there are still unanswered questions around how these
solutions scale. is is partly due to the lack of clarity on
which metrics should be used in the context of permissioned
DLT, and partly due to inherent diculties in comparing the
dierent approaches consistently. Scalability of condential-
ity preserving methods on HLF, Corda, and orum have
partially been addressed in [11], [14], and [5], respectively.
However, when designing a solution, custom scalability tests
may need to be designed to t the particular use case.
4 Example Use Case
A leer of credit is a nancial instrument in which a bank
vouches to pay a seller if a buyer is unable to make an agreed-
upon payment. Parties on a DLT network used to record
leers of credit are banks, sellers, and buyers. Sellers and
buyers will neither want to share that they are entering in a
business relationship nor the details of their agreement with
the network. Under the assumption that logic contained in
a leer of credit is highly standardized and non-condential,
the design guide will lead to the following design.
Identities of parties will need to be veried by an inde-
pendent party, most likely a bank. Since, according to GDPR
regulations, any party is allowed to request deletion of per-
sonally identiable information, according to Figure 1 any
such data will need to be stored o-ledger. All non-personal
data will not be required to be deleted and can therefore be
included in transactions. We will work under the assumption
that there is no regulation against the sharing and storing of
encrypted data. e solution can then be designed such that
Mechanism H
LF
Co
rd
a

or
um
Pa
rti
es Separation of ledgers ff ff ff
One-time public key — ff ?
Zero knowledge proof of identity ff — —
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
Separation of ledgers ff ff ff
O-chain peer data ff ? —
Symmetric keys ff ff ff
Merkle trees and tear-os ? ff —
Zero-knowledge proofs1 ? ? ?
Multiparty computation ? ? ?
Homomorphic encryption1 ? ? ?
Lo
gi
c Install contract on involved nodes ff N/A ff
O-chain execution engine ? ff —
Trusted execution environments1 — — —
M
isc
. Private sequencing service possible ff ff ff
Open source ff ff ff
Table 1. Comparison of permissioned DLTs with respect
to privacy and condentiality mechanisms. ff: native sup-
port, ?: not natively supported, but can be implemented, —:
requires substantial rewriting of the code base. 1 Maturity
level described in Section 2.
transaction validators will be the parties associated with the
transaction, and therefore will have the authority to view the
transaction contents. According to Figure 1, these require-
ments lead to a design where groups of transacting parties
use a separate ledger in order to keep their interactions hid-
den from the wider network. If a third party is trusted to
run the ordering service and have visibility of transacting
parties, transaction data can be encrypted.
5 Enterprise Implementations
is section describes how the privacy and condentiality
mechanisms discussed in Section 2 have been implemented
in three of the most prominent permissioned blockchain plat-
forms - Hyperledger Fabric, Corda, and orum. ese DLTs
were chosen because they are a) open-source, b) backed by
large and active communities, and c) represent three dierent
ways in which a certain level of privacy and condentiality
can be achieved. An overview of natively supported meth-
ods and extendibility of these platforms is given in Table 1.
is section provides a point-in-time evaluation only. e
teams behind included platforms are actively researching
ways to improve privacy and condentiality further, predom-
inantly in the cryptography domain. In the coming years, it
is therefore likely that there will be more native implemen-
tations of advanced cryptographic techniques such as ZKPs,
homomorphic encryption, MPC, and TEEs.
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Hyperledger Fabric Fabric is an open source permissioned
blockchain under the umbrella of the Linux Foundation’s Hy-
perledger project. It was designed specically for enterprise
use and has a strong focus on privacy and condentiality. e
primary mechanisms for privacy and condentiality preser-
vation is through channels, which provide a separate ledger
for a subset of participants [4]. Identities of channel mem-
bers are not revealed to the wider network and transactions
are only shared between channel members. Condentiality
of smart contract logic, called chaincode, is provided by en-
suring only peers that have the chaincode installed are able
to view the chaincode. e exception to the condentiality
boundary of the channel is the service used to provide con-
sensus on the order of transactions. In Fabric, the ordering
service has full visibility of channel members as well as all
transactions that are submied to a channel. is is a poten-
tial breach of privacy and condentiality and is discussed in
greater detail in Section 3.4. In order to mitigate the risk of
leaking information, channel members can choose to run the
ordering service themselves given appropriate infrastructure.
Within a channel, Fabric provides privacy of parties with
Idemix [8], enabling zero-knowledge proof of identity using
the public key of the issuing certicate authority to verify the
credentials rather than disclosing the identity. Condential
data is also possible between sub-groups of channel partici-
pants through Private Data Collections (PDCs), which allow
for data to be kept o the channel ledger (o-chain) and
referenced in transactions by hash only. However, members
of PDCs are listed in associated transactions, so this method
of condentiality preservation is useful only if privacy of
interaction is not required within the channel.
Corda Corda, an open source DLT, is being developed by
R3, a consortium consisting of mostly nancial institutions.
Rather than globally broadcasting transactions to all peers
in the network or a sub-network, Corda uses a concept of
peer-to-peer transactions. e peer-to-peer nature of Corda
naturally lends itself to condentiality of data through segre-
gation; interactions between parties are kept private, both in
terms of the relationships that exist and data shared between
them. If assets are to be transferred beyond the initial trans-
acting parties, Corda allows the use of one-time public keys
in transactions to further conceal identities from uninvolved
parties. For situations where parties within a single trans-
action should not have access to all transaction data, Corda
also provides support for Merkle tree tear-os. A common
scenario for this is when an oracle is needed to aest to a
certain piece of data in a transaction, but the transaction
participants do not want all the components of the trans-
action visible to the oracle. Corda provides condentiality
of business logic by separating the execution of business
logic from the verication of valid transactions. e rules
that dene which parties are required to sign a transaction
are contained in contracts associated with each state that
is provided as input to a transaction. ese parties execute
business logic outside of the platform to determine whether
the transaction proposal is valid, giving parties the added
freedom to choose a programming language to implement
business logic. e on-chain contract is used to verify the
transaction’s signatories.
orum JPMorgan partnered with the Ethereum Enter-
prise Alliance to develop orum, a permissioned blockchain
based on the Ethereum protocol. Its key dierentiator is the
ability to store private state separate from the public ledger.
is separation of private state from public state is the pri-
mary mechanism for condentiality of data and smart con-
tracts. Private state and smart contracts are updated through
private transactions that are distributed to all nodes in the
network. However only a hash of the submied data is in-
cluded in the transaction itself. e parties involved in the
transaction receive encrypted data, which means decryption
is required before a party can update their private state. One
key limitation of the private transaction model in orum
is that it does not prevent the double spending of assets. e
contents of private transactions are shared only between
specied parties. Since there is no global visibility of private
assets, a party may spend an asset multiple times by speci-
fying dierent receivers in separate transactions. Another
major drawback of orum is that the public ledger includes
private transactions, including the list of participants of the
transaction, revealing to the entire network which parties
are interacting.
6 Conclusion
From transparent execution of smart contracts to increased
data integrity and availability, DLT has the potential to pro-
vide a new framework for the way collaborative business
processes are conducted. However, business interactions
can contain highly sensitive information, including personal
data, and a leak thereof could have large economic impact.
Any enterprise use case may require that privacy of inter-
acting entities be preserved and that both the data and the
business logic that dene how data are updated and kept con-
dential. In DLT implementations, these requirements will
likely determine how the network is structured and what
privacy and condentiality mechanisms can be deployed.
is paper lays out relevant key mechanisms for meeting
said requirements, covering segmentation and encryption
techniques. It further gives the reader a guide to both de-
ne their particular needs and discover possible solutions.
To illustrate how the mechanisms are applied in current
DLTs, this paper described how three representative DLTs
for enterprise implement privacy and condentiality. Apart
from native support in existing enterprise solutions, nan-
cial restrictions, scalability of a solution, and infrastructure
administration may also play an important role in realizing
the ideal solution.
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